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In a recent work [Schneider et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 3838 (2011)], the authors proposed a simple
measure for network robustness under malicious attacks on nodes. Using a greedy algorithm, they found that
the optimal structure with respect to this quantity is an onion structure in which high-degree nodes form a core
surrounded by rings of nodes with decreasing degree. However, in real networks the failure can also occur in links
such as dysfunctional power cables and blocked airlines. Accordingly, complementary to the node-robustness
measurement (Rn), we propose a link-robustness index (Rl). We show that solely enhancing Rn cannot guarantee
the improvement of Rl . Moreover, the structure of an Rl-optimized network is found to be entirely different
from that of an onion network. In order to design robust networks that are resistant to a more realistic attack
condition, we propose a hybrid greedy algorithm that takes both the Rn and Rl into account. We validate the
robustness of our generated networks against malicious attacks mixed with both nodes and links failure. Finally,
some economical constraints for swapping the links in real networks are considered, and signiﬁcant improvement
in both aspects of robustness is still achieved.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of the infrastructure in modern society is
of great importance. Systems such as the Internet, power
grids, transportation, and fuel distribution networks need to be
robust and capable of enduring random failures or intentional
attacks [1]. Many processes taking place in networks could be
signiﬁcantly impacted if the network structures are damaged
[2,3]. Examples of such processes in nature and society include
the spread of epidemics [4,5], synchronization [6–8], random
walks [9,10], trafﬁc [11,12], and opinion formation [13,14].
Therefore, the robustness of different network structures has
been studied intensively in the past decade [15–19]. It was also
revealed that the shortest path [20] and graph spectrum [21,22]
can be employed to estimate network robustness. Moreover,
an interdependent network [23,24] was proposed to model the
catastrophic cascade of failures in real systems.
In a recent work, a new measure was proposed for network
robustness under malicious attack on the nodes [25]. This
measurement, which we call node robustness in this paper,
considers the size of the largest component during all possible
malicious attacks, namely Rn = 1N
∑1
q=1/N S(q), where N
is the number of nodes in the network and S(q) is the
relative size of a giant component (i.e., the fraction of
nodes in the largest connected cluster) after removing qN
largest degree nodes. The normalization factor 1/N makes
the robustness of networks with different sizes comparable. A
robust network generally corresponds to a largeRn value.With
this measurement, a greedy algorithm is designed to enhance
the node robustness in real systems, and a large improvement
is observed even though a small number of links are modiﬁed.
Moreover, the optimal structure for node robustness is found
to be an onion structure in which high-degree nodes are highly
connected with surrounding rings of nodes of decreasing
degree. Recently, a simple method was also proposed to
generate such robust onion networks [26].
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However, the analysis in Ref. [25] is only based on targeted
attacks on nodes. In reality, failures can happen in connections
between nodes as well [18]. For example, power cables may
be dysfunctional, and some airlines may be forced to cease
operations due to terrible weather or terrorist attacks. In this
paper, we propose a link-robustness index (Rl) to measure
the ability of a network to resist link failures. We ﬁnd that
solely enhancing Rn does not always improve Rl , and the
network structure for optimal Rl is far different from that of
the onion network. In addition, we ﬁnd that the graph spectrum
index [21,22] only measures robustness against an attack on
nodes, but it cannot reﬂect the link robustness of networks. In
order to design robust networks that are resistant to different
kinds of malicious attacks, we propose a greedy algorithm
that is aimed at both Rn and Rl improvement. To validate
the robustness of the resulting networks, we examined them
against a more realistic attack strategy which combines both
nodes and links failure. Because the manipulation of a real
network always involves certain economical constraints, we
took this into account in our method and some signiﬁcant
improvement in both Rl and Rn are still obtained. Finally, our
study suggests that robustness improvement depends strongly
on the considered attack strategy. Therefore, each real system
should have its own optimal structure for robustness based on
the attack it receives.
II. LINK ROBUSTNESS OF NETWORKS
Since a robust network should be able to resist the most
destructive attack, we begin our analysis by comparing the
harm caused by different malicious attack strategies on links.
The most destructive attack is supposed to destroy the most
“important” links in the networks. As in Ref. [25], we monitor
the size of the giant component to estimate how the network
gets destroyed after these “important” links are removed step
by step. There are many methods to measure the “importance”
of links. Here we mainly consider three indexes to identify
the most important link to delete. The indexes include edge-
betweenness, link clustering coefﬁcient, and degree product.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) The change of the relative size of the giant
component S(p) with the fraction of links p removed by different
strategies in BA networks. The BA networks are with N = 100 and
¯k = 6. The results are averaged over 100 independent realizations.
The edge-betweenness of a link is the fraction of shortest
paths that pass through it [27]. In this strategy, the link with
the highest edge-betweenness is removed in each step. The
link cluster coefﬁcient is the number of triangles to which a
given link belongs divided by the number of triangles that
might potentially include it, given the degrees of the adjacent
nodes [28]. In this strategy, the link with the lowest link cluster
coefﬁcient is removed in each step. The degree product of a
link is simply calculated bymultiplying the degree of the nodes
on the two ends of the link. In this strategy, the link with the
largest degree product is removed in each step. Moreover,
we also use the random link removal as a benchmark for
comparison. In order to simulate a more harmful strategy, we
apply a dynamical approach in which the “importance” of the
links (i.e., edge-betweenness, link clustering coefﬁcient, and
degree product) is recalculated after each link removal during
the attack [25].
Figure 1 reports how the relative size of the giant component
S(p) changes with the fraction of links p removed by different
strategies in a Barabasi-Albert (BA) network model [29].
Obviously, the most destructive strategy is the one based
on the edge-betweenness since S(p) decreases most quickly.
Links with high betweenness usually have many shortest paths
passing through. Cutting these links will force a large number
of nodes to look for an alternative shortest path to communicate
with each other. Gradually, the highest edge-betweenness link
will be in the only path connecting many nodes. At this time,
cutting this linkwill isolate these nodes. Interestingly, although
the degree-based node attack strategy can cause severe damage
to the network, cutting the links connecting high degree nodes
leads to an even less harmful effect than the random removal
method to the network connectivity. This is reasonable because
the hubs can be strongly connected with each other, and this
is well known as the rich-club phenomenon [30].
Based on the analysis above, we will use edge-betweenness
as our link removal strategy throughout the paper. Accordingly,
we also propose a link-robustness index (Rl) based on the
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FIG. 2. (Color online) The Rl of BA networks with N = 100
and ¯k = 6, and the corresponding Rn-optimized and Rl-optimized
networks. The results are averaged over 100 independent realizations.
highest edge-betweenness attack strategy as
Rl = 1
E
1∑
p=1/E
S(p), (1)
whereE is the total number of links. This measure captures the
network response to any fraction of link removal. Apparently,
if a network is robust against link attack, its Rl should be
relatively large. We remark that a similar index was designed
recently to suppress the spread of epidemics [31].
In Ref. [25], it is found that themost robust structure against
node attack is the onion-like network, which corresponds to
the topology with maximum Rn. However, it is still unclear
whether this structure is tolerant to the link attack as well. We
therefore report the Rl in BA networks and the corresponding
onion networks in Fig. 2. Interestingly, despite the fact that
the onion networks are resistant to malicious node attack, they
are weaker than the original BA networks with respect to
the intentional link attack. More speciﬁcally, the Rl in onion
networks is 19.9% lower than that in theBAmodel (for detailed
values, see Table I). One typical onion network is shown in
Fig. 3(a). As we can see, nodes with almost the same degree
are connected to form a layer, and different layers rely on
several links to communicate. Since the edge-betweenness of
these intralayer links is relatively high, they will be removed
early when the network is attacked on the links. Consequently,
some isolated layers can be formed quickly, which makes the
onion structure sensitive to the link attack.
Therefore, it is necessary to design a structuralmanipulating
method to enhance the link robustness for the networks. Since
changing the degree of a node is commonly assumed to be
more expensive than changing the connections, we keep the
degree of each node invariant in our algorithm. Starting from
an original network, we swap the connections of two randomly
chosen edges, i.e., we randomly select two edges ab and cd
(which connect node a with node b, and node c with node d ,
respectively), then change them to ad and bc only if Rnewl >
Roldl . We then repeat this procedure with another randomly
chosen pair of edges until no further substantial improvement
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TABLE I. Properties in the different networks: node-robustness index (Rn), link-robustness index (Rl), the spectrum of the adjacency matrix
(λ1/λ2), degree assortativity (r), average shortest path length (〈d〉), and clustering coefﬁcient (〈C〉).
Network Algorithm Rn Rl λ1/λ2 r 〈d〉 〈C〉
Original 0.201 0.429 1.856 −0.181 2.576 0.142
BA Rn-optimized 0.352 0.343 2.579 0.158 2.828 0.117
Rl-optimized 0.200 0.497 1.891 −0.162 2.584 0.137
Hybrid-optimized 0.219 0.491 1.898 −0.153 2.583 0.133
Original 0.110 0.244 2.382 −0.208 2.738 0.625
USAir Rn-optimized 0.293 0.245 5.054 −0.148 2.875 0.280
Rl-optimized 0.111 0.319 2.631 −0.315 2.492 0.480
Hybrid-optimized 0.196 0.298 3.018 −0.237 2.593 0.429
Original 0.111 0.093 1.122 0.001 6.588 0.123
Grid Rn-optimized 0.240 0.173 1.404 0.356 6.128 0.015
Rl-optimized 0.125 0.248 1.192 0.019 4.974 0.024
Hybrid-optimized 0.161 0.237 1.272 0.110 5.017 0.031
is achieved for a given large number of consecutive swapping
trials (here, we set it as 104).
Actually, the link swapping greedy algorithm has been
commonly applied to achieve the optimal or near-optimal
network functions such as node robustness [25], immunization
[31], synchronization [32], and so on. In our case, although
we cannot guarantee that this algorithm will obtain the global
optimum, we have checked that the results from this algorithm
are relatively stable in different swap trials. Moreover, it yields
similar results to those obtained by the simulated annealing
algorithm in improving link robustness.
In Fig. 2, we can clearly see that the Rl can be signiﬁcantly
improved by the algorithm. Compared to the original BA
network, Rl can be increased by 15.8% (see Table I for
detailed values). In Fig. 3(b), we also show the structure of the
Rl-optimized network. Different from the ‘onion” network
obtained in Ref. [25], the Rl-optimized network exhibits
FIG. 3. (Color online) Simple examples of (a) the Rn-optimized
network (the onion network), (b) the Rl-optimized network (the
urchin network), and (c) the hybrid-optimized network. The size of
the nodes is proportional to their degree. Both networks are obtained
by using the corresponding greedy algorithm in a BA model with
N = 100 and ¯k = 6.
roughly the prickle-covered ‘urchin” structure in which no
obvious community exists and nodes with small degree are
not inclined to connect to each other but mainly attach to the
nodes with higher degree. In this way, each pair of nodes has
many paths to communicate with one another. Even many
highest edge-betweenness links are removed, the network can
stay connected.
III. IMPROVING ROBUSTNESS IN REAL NETWORKS
In real systems, failures can occur not only in nodes but
also in links. For example, heavy snow can cause some power
cables to snap, and mechanical aircraft problems can result
in ﬂight delays or cancellations. Therefore, when designing
robust networks, we should take both Rn and Rl into account.
In order to achieve this objective, we propose a hybrid
greedy algorithm tomanipulate the network structure for better
robustness. Different from the process in the previous section,
we swap the connections of two randomly chosen edges only
if both Rn and Rl are improved. The swapping process stops
if there is no improvement in a certain number of consecutive
swapping trials, which is set to 104 here.
In addition to the BA network model, we consider two real
systems: (i) USAir: the US air transportation system [33] that
contains 332 airports and 2126 airlines. (ii) Grid: an electrical
power grid in part of western Europe (mainly Portugal and
Spain) [34], with nodes representing generators, and links
corresponding to the high-voltage transmission lines between
them. This network contains 217 nodes and 320 links. Both
real networks are well connected and without any isolated
component.
For each network mentioned above, we obtained the corre-
sponding Rn-optimized, Rl-optimized, and hybrid-optimized
networks using the greedy algorithms, and the related results
are given in Table I. As we can see from the BA model
and the USAir network, optimizing Rn cannot guarantee the
improvement of Rl , and optimizing Rl cannot always increase
Rn either. However, the hybrid method can improve both Rn
and Rl from the original networks. More speciﬁcally, Rn and
Rl are increased by 78.2% and 22.1%, respectively, in the
USAir network. In the Grid network, the improvement of Rn
is 46.4% and the increment of Rl can reach even 154.8%.
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Compared with Rn-optimized and Rl-optimized networks, the
hybrid-optimized networks do not have the advantage of a
single aspect of robustness, but they are maintained with a
reasonable balance between Rn and Rl .
The spectrum of the adjacency matrix, namely the ratio of
the largest and second largest eigenvalues λ1/λ2, was formerly
used to characterize network robustness [21,22]. However,
we observe that the spectrum index has a certain positive
correlation with Rn but no obvious relation to Rl . Therefore, it
actually only represents the node robustness but cannot reﬂect
the network robustness against link attacks. The topology
properties of the resulting networks are also analyzed. The
result in Table I shows that the hybrid-optimized networks
usually have larger assortativity, a smaller average shortest
path length, and a lower cluster coefﬁcient than the original
networks. It has been revealed that the optimal structure for
Rn is the onion structure in which nodes with almost the same
degree are connected, so themost signiﬁcant feature for theRn-
optimized network is the large assortativity. For the aspect of
Rl , the most destructive attack strategy is based on the highest
load (edge-betweenness), so the less signiﬁcant the community
structure is, the higher Rl will be. Consequently, the network
that is robust against link attack should have a small average
shortest path length and a small cluster coefﬁcient. Unlike the
onion networks, theRl-optimized networks usually do not have
a large assortativity, which explainswhy the onion networks do
not have a high Rl . For the resulting networks from the hybrid
algorithm, they will ﬁnally carry these topology properties
from both Rn-optimized and Rl-optimized networks. One
example of a hybrid-optimized network is shown in Fig. 3(c).
The structure is between the “onion” network and the “urchin”
network. Although the hybrid-optimized network looks like an
“urchin” network, it still has some links connecting the nodes
with small degree.
Since the attacks in nodes and links can happen simulta-
neously, one interesting aspect to consider is to see how the
networks in Table I react to the attack combining node failures
and link failures. Accordingly, we designed a mixed attack
strategy inwhich the largest degree nodeswill be removedwith
probability f and the links with highest edge-betweenness will
be cut with probability 1 − f . The procedure goes on until the
size of the giant component reaches 0. We ﬁrst set f = 0.5 as
an example and report in Figs. 4 and 5 the performance of the
networks in Table I. The results show that the hybrid-optimized
networks preserve the giant component most effectively.
We then consider the mixed attack process with f varying
from 0 to 1. When f = 0, the process is just the pure highest
load (edge-betweenness) attack on links. When f = 1, it
returns to the largest degree attack on nodes. Here, we are
mainly interested in the situation when 0 < f < 1. In order
to estimate in which range of f the hybrid-optimized network
has an advantage, we generalize the deﬁnition of robustness to
a quantity Q in the mixed attack process,
Q = 1
M
M∑
m=1
S(m), (2)
where M is the total number of steps to reduce the size of the
giant component to 0. Q measures how tolerant a network is
against a malicious attack (which can be a node attack, a link
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The change of the relative size of giant
componentsS with attack stepmwhen different networks are attacked
by the mixed strategy. The original network is USAir and the fraction
of node failure f is set as 0.5. The results are averaged over 100
independent realizations.
attack, or a combination of the two). According to Eq. (2),
Q = Rl when f = 0 and Q = Rn when f = 1.
The Q value of the networks in Table I under different f
are reported in Figs. 6 and 7. Obviously, the original networks
perform worst under any f . The Rn-optimized networks can
indeed improve the Q value when f is large. However, they
do not have too much of an advantage when f is small.
More speciﬁcally, in the USAir network (see Fig. 6), the Rn-
optimized network has almost the same Q when f is smaller
than 0.4. The Rl-optimized network can signiﬁcantly improve
the Q value when f is small, but Q drops nearly back to the
original network level when f is large. A similar trend can be
observed also in the Grid network (Fig. 7). These phenomena
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The change of the relative size of giant
componentsS with attack stepmwhen different networks are attacked
by the mixed strategy. The original network is Grid and the fraction
of node failure f is set as 0.5. The results are averaged over 100
independent realizations.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) The Q value of different networks when f
changes from 0 to 1. The original network is USAir. The results are
averaged over 100 independent realizations.
indicate that the Rn-optimized network is very sensitive to
link attack while the Rl-optimized network is fragile when
nodes are attacked. The hybrid-optimized networks, however,
perform very stably under different attack situations (i.e.,
different f ), which suggests that the hybrid-optimized network
is a much more reliable structure in reality, especially when
the fraction of node and link failure is unknown. In addition,
compared to theRn-optimized andRl-optimized networks, the
hybrid-optimized network can even enjoy a higher Q value in
a certain range of f (0.2  f  0.75 in the USAir network
and 0.1  f  0.9 in the Grid network). In other words, when
both links and nodes are attacked in the network, the hybrid-
optimized network seems to be the most robust structure.
Finally, we consider some economical constraints on im-
proving robustness in a real system. First of all, the total length
(geographically calculated) of the links cannot be exceedingly
large. Secondly, the number of changes of links should be
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FIG. 7. (Color online) The Q value of different networks when
f changes from 0 to 1. The original network is Grid. The results are
averaged over 100 independent realizations.
relatively small. Therefore, to reconstruct real networks like
USAir and Grid, we add two more constraints to the greedy
algorithm: the swap of two links is only accepted if the total
geographic length of the edges does not increase, and both Rn
andRl are increased more than certain values (denoted asRn
andRl) [35]. Evenwith these strong constraints,Rn andRl of
real networks can still be signiﬁcantly improved. Speciﬁcally,
with only 3.9% of links changed, the Rn and Rl of the USAir
network can be increased by 56% and 17%, respectively (Rn:
from 0.110 to 0.172; Rl : from 0.244 to 0.285). In the Grid
network, the Rn can be improved by 23% (from 0.111 to
0.136) and the Rl can be improved by 20% (from 0.093 to
0.112) with only 6.9% of links changed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Learning how to enhance the robustness of networks is
an important topic that is related to protecting real systems
from random failures and malicious attacks. In the literature,
most of the works have been focused on proposing methods
to improve network robustness against an attack on nodes.
However, the connections between nodes can also be damaged
due to unexpected accidents or situations. This requires us to
take link failure into account when designing robust networks.
In this paper, based on the highest load attack strategy, we
propose the link-robustness index to estimate how a network
can resist the most destructive targeted attack on its links.
Moreover, we designed a hybrid greedy algorithm to enhance
both node robustness and link robustness. When attacked with
the strategy combining node and link failure, the resulting
networks from the hybrid method outperform the networks in
which only Rn or Rl was improved. Finally, some economical
constraints are considered when enhancing the robustness of
real networks, and some signiﬁcant improvement are observed.
As shown in our results, different attack strategies require
different optimal network structures to be tolerant to the
damage. From a practical point of view, the hybrid method
can create a reliable network which is generally robust to an
attack combining node failures and link failures. In reality,
the probability of node failure and link failure can hardly be
known, especially when systems undergo malicious attacks.
Since the hybrid-optimized networks perform very stably
under different attack situations, they can be the most suitable
structures when designing real systems. Finally, we remark
that many possible extensions of this work can be made in
the future. For example, there is a family of problems in
which the goal is to minimize robustness in order to design
an effective immunization strategy [31,36], and the hybrid
immunization on both links and nodes can be considered in
this case. Moreover, link failure should also be taken into
consideration when studying interdependent networks, and the
idea of a hybrid-optimized method can be extended to design
a robust structure for interdependent systems.
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